Yemen Saudi Agreement
„The agreement of the Yemeni parties to accelerate the implementation of the agreement reflects a serious desire for dialogue… and support the paths to a pol solution,-to end the crisis,“ tweeted Khalid bin Salman, Saudi Arabia`s deputy defense minister. Since the signing of the Riyadh Agreement, the United Arab Emirates has not provided further statements of support for the agreement; nor is there any evidence that the United Arab Emirates is putting pressure on the TCC to comply with its rules. In this context, the list of potential perpetrators of the 18 January military camp mosque attack is longer than Hadi liked to make out when he pointed to the Houthis. Even the fact that it is credible that the UAE could have ordered the attack means that the Riyadh Agreement as a whole is under serious threat and, with it, the future of Saudi-UAE cooperation in Yemen and beyond. The statement also stressed that the obstacle to the differences between the government and the STC on the order of implementation of the military and political components of the agreement has been overcome, agreeing to complete the military and security plans necessary for the implementation of the military and security component. While these measures to implement the Riyadh Agreement represent remarkable progress, it is not yet known whether they will help overcome long-term divisions between the two sides or prevent both sides from undermining the agreement. A more transparent discussion on the militarization of the South and the responsibility for its protection, as well as a rigorous dialogue process that would lead to local ambitions and political party agendas, is needed for the Riyadh agreement to make a real and lasting difference and prevent the country`s fragmentation. Observers believe that the main obstacle to the Riyadh agreement is not to withdraw from the Abyan confrontation zones or form a government, but to push both sides to the agreement to make painful concessions, provided for by the agreement, with regard to the later stages of military and security measures, which include the transfer of heavy weapons and the withdrawal of armed forces from the provinces. each party for its own area of influence, as is the case for Shabwa governorate, which the Muslim Brotherhood considers one of their main strongholds after losing Al-Jawf and Nehm, while the STC does not seem to accept the idea of abandoning its security influence in Aden in the face of the growing lack of trust between the two sides.